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anks have traditionally walked a fine line with 
regard to money laundering and related 
1 compliance. On one side, under the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000, there is the possibility of 
breaching the laws pertaining to money laundering and 
the criminal sanctions that will follow and also the 
possibility of a regulatory action undertaken by the 
Financial Services Authority for failure to implement 
adequate money laundering prevention procedures. On 
the other, increasing costs leading to customer loss have 
been caused by overly thorough adherence to best practice 
for the prevention of money laundering. Walking, such a 
line is precarious at best but an additional hindrance to 
banks is that the crime of money laundering is relatively 
modern and has been applied with little success in the 
UK. Consequently, banks frequently have little to guide 
them when confronted with situations involving 
questionable clients and the possibility of money 
laundering.
One of the most difficult situations is the confrontation 
between tipping-off under section 93D of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1988 and a bank's ability to defend itself against 
a claim brought by the customer under suspicion. In such 
a situation, the bank may have to choose between 
incurring criminal liability and simply remaining 
defenceless to a civil suit brought by the customer. This 
was considered in Bank of Scotland v A, The Times, 6 
February 2001; judgment handed down on 18 January 
2001.
THE FACTS
A was a company who was a customer of the Bank of 
Scotland, who had been introduced by a respectable third 
party. Within a couple of years of opening sterling and 
dollar accounts, large sums of money were being 
deposited in As accounts. This alarmed the Bank of 
Scotland and due diligence led it to consider the 
possibility that the money had been obtained through 
Prime Bank Instrument Fraud or something similar.
o
Therefore, the Bank of Scotland alerted the police, the 
ICC Commercial Crime Bureau and the British Bankers 
Association. Upon alerting these parties, the Bank of 
Scotland became aware of investigations into activities
o
closely associated with A. As a result, the Bank of 
Scotland believed that it faced a dilemma. If it paid the 
money out from the accounts it could be considered a 
constructive trustee. If it refused to pay money out, it 
would be subject to an action from A and would be unable 
to defend itself, since the police had invoked section 93D 
of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, thus preventing the Bank 
of Scotland revealing the information it had received from
o
them.
In an attempt to clarify its position, the Bank of 
Scotland made an application for directions, without 
notice and in private to Lightman J on 16 November 
1999. Lightman J granted an injunction against the Bank 
of Scotland, restraining it from making any payments 
from the accounts in question. Further to this order, the 
solicitors to the Bank of Scotland wrote to A, stating that 
the bank was unhappy about certain aspects of 
transactions that had taken place on the accounts and that 
in the meantime, no further transactions of any sort could 
be allowed on the accounts.
A did not take any action until 21 December 1999, 
when it made an application to the Commercial Court. A 
sought an order that the sums in the accounts be paid to 
A's solicitors, arguing that it had an impeccable reputation 
and that there was no evidence to suggest that the money 
was tainted. At this point, A was unaware of the 
injunction granted by Lightman J. Indeed, when the case 
was brought before Gray J, he was unaware of the 
injunction and counsel for the Bank of Scotland was 
forced to inform Gray J of the order once A and their 
lawyers had withdrawn. After considering this, Gray J, 
made an order that unless an application was made by the 
Bank of Scotland to the court before 17 January 2000, it 
would have to pay the contents of A's accounts to A's 
solicitors.
The unfortunate effect of the proceedings in the 
Commercial Court was to alert A to the possibility of a 
criminal investigation, though they did not have any 
details of the investigation. Following the appearance 
before the Commercial Court, a series of applications 
were made to the court. These resulted in a variation to 
the order of Lightman I, allowing the Chancery
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proceedings to be disclosed. The Commercial Court
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proceedings were stayed by consent. In addition, the 
contents of the Bank of Scotland's skeleton arguments 
from the application to Lightman J were disclosed, as 
were the transcripts of the private hearings. Furthermore, 
the Bank of Scotland released the money in A's accounts 
but with the consent of all the parties froze a small sum to 
safeguard its ability to recover the costs that it had 
incurred.
Thus, when the parties appeared before Laddie J in May 
2000, the only issues that remained were as to costs and 
for guidance for banks as to the proper practice in the 
future in such circumstances. Laddie J found that 
Lightman J was wrong to grant the injunction and that it 
served no useful purpose, thus, he discharged the 
injunction. Laddie J also attempted to formulate a series 
of directions to assist banks in the future and awarded 
costs in favour of A.
Laddie J divided his guidelines into two situations, one 
where the bank wished to make the payments requested 
by its customer, and the other where the bank did not 
wish to make the payments.
Where the bank wishes to make the payments
(1) If the bank wished to make the payments from the 
account and was aware that an investigation was taking 
place, it should request permission from the police to 
make the payment. The bank should also warn the 
police that the likely effect of refusal would be the 
issue of proceedings against the bank and the 
possibility of tipping off the customer that an 
investigation was in progress. In addition, the police 
might be asked to attend the proceedings brought by 
the customer to justify their refusal, as was suggested 
in C v S [ 1999] 1 WLR 1551. If the bank was refused 
permission to make the payment and the court was 
not shown any material to justify non-payment, or 
refused to act upon evidence that was not to be made 
available to the customer, the court would be likely to 
make an order for payment to nullify the effect the 
police's refusal of permission.
(2) If the police were to give permission, the bank would 
incur no liability under section 93A (3)(b) of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1988 and there would be no 
question of a breach of section 93D of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1988.
(3) If the police refused to give permission for the 
payment to be made but the bank still wished to make 
the payments, the bank should apply for a hearing in 
private. There, the court could require the police to 
appear and explain their refusal of permission. In 
addition, the police would be invited to state what 
information (if any) could be disclosed to the court 
and the customer in the event of the customer 
commencing proceedings against the bank.
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(4) This would allow the court, at the end of the private 
hearing, to give directions as to the extent of the 
information that could be released by the bank if the 
customer brought a claim.
(5) If the police continued to refuse to allow payment 
from the account, the bank should refrain from 
making the payment, as that would constitute a 
criminal offence.
(6) If the customer brought proceedings against the bank, 
the proceedings should not be heard before the same 
judge who presided over the private hearing or who 
pave directions as to the information that could be
o
disclosed.
(7) If the customer brought proceedings against the bank, 
the bank could rely upon and disclose to the customer, 
any information that was permitted under paragraph 
(3) as well as any material that the police agreed to 
being disclosed. If the court ordered the bank to
o
make the payment, the bank must follow the order 
and it should send a copy of that order to the police. 
Following this court order or the order described in
o
paragraph (3) would not constitute an offence. Any 
criminal proceedings to this effect would be an abuse 
of process as demonstrated inCvS[199l] 1 WLR 
1551 or would be defeated by an extension of the law 
of necessity at common law. One should also note that 
payment from the account under a court order would 
not constitute knowing assistance.
(8) The refusal to pay the customer might alert the 
customer to the possibility of a criminal investigation 
being undertaken with respect to the account or the 
customer, thus, it may prejudice an investigation that 
is underway or that is about to be launched. However, 
this would not expose the bank to criminal 
proceedings under section 93D of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1988, as such a refusal would have been caused by 
the police's refusal to allow the payment. If a 
prosecution were to be brought it would be an abuse 
of process.
Where the bank does not wish to make the 
payments
Laddie J assumed that the reasons for a bank wishing 
not to make payments would be fear of prosecution under 
section 93A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 or fear that a 
constructive trust exists which would render the bank 
liable for any sums paid out. He stated that:
(1) The bank should tell the police that they did not wish 
to make the payment from the account and that they 
feared that the customer would or already had called 
on the bank to make the payment. The bank should 
ask the police to identify any information that they 
would allow the bank to disclose to the court and the 
customer in any proceedings brought by the customer 25
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to enforce the payment. The bank should also inform 
the police that the court might ask the police to attend 
and justify why they refused to allow adequate 
disclosure. In addition, the bank should tell the police 
that the refusal to allow adequate disclosure would be 
likely to make it apparent to the customer that the 
reasons for refusing to make the payment were due to 
a serious crime inquiry.
(2) If the police allowed adequate disclosure for the 
purpose of the bank defending any proceedings 
brought by the customer, that information may be 
shown to court and customer without breaching 
section 93D of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
(3) If the police refused to allow adequate disclosure, the 
bank should make an application to the court in 
private, inviting the police to attend and justify its 
position.
(4) At the end of the private hearing, the judge should be 
invited to decide what information the bank can 
disclose to the customer if proceedings are 
commenced. The matter of who should bear costs for 
the private hearing would depend upon how 
reasonable the bank and police have been in trying to 
reach a compromise.
(5) The judge who hears the proceedings brought by the 
customer should preferably be different to the judge 
who presided over the private hearing.
(6) In proceedings brought by the customer, the bank 
can only disclose information to the court and 
customer that the police have consented to being 
disclosed or which the judge decided should be 
allowed in the private hearing.
(7) The bank should not bring private pre-emptive 
proceedings seeking to freeze the customer's account. 
However, if such proceedings have already been 
brought, they should be brought before a judge who 
did not preside over the private hearing. In addition, 
disclosure should be limited to that which the bank is 
permitted to disclose to the customer on any 
subsequent inter paries hearing.
(8) If the court orders the bank to pay the money, the 
bank should comply with that order and send a copy 
of the order to the police. Compliance with the 
directions of a judge which were set out at the private 
hearing or compliance with an order to pay will not 
constitute an offence as a prosecution in either 
situation would constitute an abuse of process or be 
defeated by an extension of the law of necessity at 
common law.
(9) Compliance with a court order for payment will not 
constitute breach of any constructive trust that is 
subsequently held to exist or knowing assistance in any 
breach of trust committed bv the customer.
THE COURT OF APPEAL
Guidelines
The Court of Appeal did not endorse the directions of 
Laddie J, as they felt that the situations that could arise 
wrere so varied that it was extremely difficult to anticipate 
the best course of action. Nonetheless, they did state that 
his suggestions might be of assistance in the future. In 
addition, they approved of his decision that Lightman J 
was wrong to grant the injunction. The Court of Appeal 
stated that the appropriate order should have been an 
interim declaration under Part 25.1(l)(b) of the Civil 
Procedure Rules and added that such a declaration would be 
useful to rebut an application for summary judgment 
under Part 24.2 of the Civil Procedure Rules, that would be 
likely to result from an action against the bank by the 
customer.
The Court of Appeal laid down guidance but with the 
proviso that it was limited to what was self-evident from 
the present case:
(1) An injunction should never be granted in the 
circumstances that it was granted in the present case.
(2) If there is a dispute as to whether a payment can be 
made or disclosure made by the bank; the Serious 
Fraud Office (on behalf of the police) and the bank 
should attempt to resolve it amongst themselves.
(3) If no resolution can be reached, an application for 
interim declaratory relief should be made under Part 
25 of the Civil Procedure Rules. Each party to the 
application should bear its own costs unless the 
Serious Fraud Office acts unreasonably.
(4) If proceedings are brought by a customer of the bank, 
the bank will have to reach a commercial decision as 
to whether to contest to proceedings or not. If they 
are to be contested, this should be done in as open a 
manner as possible.
(5) In certain circumstances it may be best for the same 
judge to preside over the Part 25 application and any 
proceedings against the bank. If this occurs and there 
are proceedings of which a bank's customer is 
unaware, then there will be no question of the bank 
being subject to criminal proceedings if it acts in 
accordance with the guidance of the court.
Constructive Trusts
One point of contention that the Court of Appeal felt it 
should comment on was the claim of constructive 
trusteeship by the Bank of Scotland. This was the basis 
for their application to Lightman J and was attacked by As 
counsel. The Court of Appeal acknowledged that the 
bank-customer was a commercial relationship, rather 
than a fiduciary one, citing Foskett v McKeown [2000] 2 
WLR 1299. However, it also accepted that it was possible
Amicus Curiae Issue 35 June/July 2001
for a bank to become subject in equity to an accessory 
liability if it dishonestly assisted a breach of trust 
committed by the customer or others. After consideringJ o
a number of cases including Manchester Trust v Furness 
[1895] 2 QB 539, Foley v Hill (1848) 2 HLC 28, Selangor 
United Rubber States v Craddock (No 3) [ 1968] 1 WLR 1555, 
Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan [1995] 2 AC 378, El Ajou v Dollar 
Land Holdings [1993] 3 All ER 717 and Finers v Miro 
[1991] 1 WLR 35, the Court of Appeal suggested that the 
Bank of Scotland would be allowed to seek directions "on 
the footing that it was at least a putative fiduciary". The 
reason provided for this \vas:
'... there was a clear risk of the bank incurring liability in 
equity as an accessory to breach of trust. A bank placed in that 
dilemma ought to be able to invoke equity's assistance. Thejact 
that the bank was notjormally constituted as a trustee and that 
a tracing process would attach, not to any assets oj the bank, 
but to the chose in action representing the bank's obligation to 
its customer, ought not to be an insuperable obstacle...'.
Neuberger J appeared to have found a method of 
overcoming this obstacle bv requiring the balance of the
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account to be treated as if it had been paid into court. 
However, the Court of Appeal did not wish to encourage 
this.
Perhaps what is most heartening is the willingness 
shown by the Court of Appeal to assist financial 
institutions that are attempting to co-operate with the 
authorities by suggesting that the same judge preside over 
a Part 25 application and any other proceedings. This 
would allow proceedings to progress at a quicker pace, 
which would be beneficial for all parties in terms of time, 
resources and costs. In addition, it would ensure that the 
bank avoids any criminal liability as long as it acts in 
accordance with the declaration granted as well aso
avoiding any equitable liability. @
Costs
The Court of Appeal also approved Laddie J's decision to 
award costs against the Bank of Scotland, stating that theo 7 o
nature of the bank's business made it more appropriate 
for it to bear the costs of the defendants, than vice-versa. 
This is a rather bitter pill for a bank to swallow, since its 
attempts to co-operate with the authorities may lead it to 
litigation for which it will have to bear the costs.
o
However, it may be possible to consider this as the price 
to pay for a perception of probity and the possibility of 
avoiding heavier regulation in the future.
CONCLUSION
This case provides welcome advice to banks that find 
themselves torn between tipping off a client and being 
held as a putative fiduciary. The advice provided by the 
Court of Appeal appears to be relatively simple in that 
negotiation should take place between the Serious Fraud 
Office and the bank involved before any court applications 
are made, as well as clarifying that an interim declaration 
should be sought rather than an injunction. However, it 
remains to be seen how readily the Serious Fraud Office 
will permit the release of sufficient information for a bank 
to defend itself. This is the crux of the matter, since the 
premature release of too much information by the Serious 
Fraud Office and NCIS could result in the loss of a chance 
to obtain a successful conviction. Meanwhile, if they err 
on the side of caution, the likely and unsatisfactory result 
would be an appearance before the courts at the probable 
expense of the bank.
Michael Chan
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